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INTRODUCTION
THE LEGISLATIVE process from which issued the Transporta-
tion Act of 19581 saw a re-enactment of the ancient conflict2 over
the proper role of government in transportation pricing. Sometimes
overshadowing this historic controversy, however, was a questioning of
the fidelity of the Interstate Commerce Commission to the intent of
Congress as stated in earlier legislation. The report of the Senate
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on the bill dearly inti:
mated that the Commission had strayed from the objectives set down
by Congress in the Transportation Act of i94o:s
It nevertheless appears that the Interstate Commerce Commission has not
been consistent in the past in allowing one or another of the several modes of
transportation to assert their inherent advantages in the making of rates.
The subcommittee recommends, therefore, that the Commission consistently
follow the principle of allowing each mode of transportation to assert its in-
herent advantages, whether they be of service or of cost. In 1945 in New
Automobiles in Interstate Commerce (259 ICC 475), the subcommittee
believes that the Commission properly construed the intent of Congress in
this respect when it said: "As Congress enacted separately stated rate-making
rules for each transport agency, it obviously intended that the rates of each
such agency should be determined by us in each case according to the facts
and circumstances attending the movement of the traffic by that agency. In
other words, there appears no warrant for believing that rail rates, for ex-
ample, should be held up to a particular level to preserve a motor-rate struc-
ture, or vice versa (259 ICC at p. 538)."
The most strongly implied criticism of the Commission arose from
former Senator Wheeler's testimony before the Senate Interstate and
* A.B. 194', Clark University; M.B.A. x947, Boston University5 Ph.D. 1954, Clark
University. Associate Professor of Transportation, University of Washington.
72 Stat. S68, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1740 (1958).
2 & 3 W. & M, c. 12, § 24 (169i).
s Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Transportation Act of z9 58
S. REP. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1959), See 54 Stat. 898 (1940), 29 U.S.C,
H§2101 (1952).
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Foreign Commerce Committee. Senator Wheeler, who had been chair-
man of that committee in 194 o, maintained that Congress had intended
the inherent advantages of each form of transport to be recognized and
preserved above all else. He testified further that he understood that
the Commission had not consistently followed such a policy:4
Now, I say that it wouldn't be necessary to have any legislation, provided
that the Interstate Commerce Commission had followed the rule which they
initiated, laid down, and which Congress intended.
Since this dear recognition of the intent of the law, the Commission has
from time to time departed from the policy we thought we had made plain
in the Transportation Act of 1940 and the reports and debates thereon.
Senator Wheeler's views seem to have been endorsed by the Senate
Committee of the Eighty-fifth Congress and to have led to a reaffirma-
tion of the intent of Congress as set forth in the Act of i94o:'
The subcommittee therefore believes it necessary to amend the act only so
as, in effect, to admonish the Commission to be consistent in following the
policy enunciated in the Automobile case thus assuring reasonable freedom
in the making of competitive rates.
With due regard for the distinguished committee and its former
chairman, however, and aside from an evaluation of the wisdom of the
ICC's policy, there seems to be real uncertainty as to whether the
Commission actually has misconstrued the sense of the Act of 194o as
indicated in legislative reports and in the prolonged debate on the law
running through the three sessions of the Seventy-sixth Congress. It
may be that there was a shift in congressional intent, unexpressed in law
after i94o; and in that case, the ICC may hardly be considered at fault.
Considering that Congress in 1958 chose to re-emphasize its transporta-
tion policy as propounded in i94o, it appears worthwhile to review the
legislative process which produced the Transportation Act of 1940.
The principal criticism of the ICC's interpretation of its rate-making
powers has been directed at its inclination to allocate traffic on a "fair
share" basis, without regard to the relative operating costs of competing
forms of transport. Senator Smathers, during the Senate committee
hearing on the rate-making rule, voiced the feeling of the committee:"
'Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
Ratemaking Rte-Interstate Commerce Act, Ssth Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1958).
a Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Transportation Act of s958,
S. REP. No. 1647, 85 th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958).
'Hearings, supra note 4, at 170.
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In other words, we have been reading-our feeling is that the Commission
has been reading-into the national transportation policy, and the act, the
desire to protect another mode of transportation irrespective of whether or
not the lowered rate sought by the first mode of transportation was com-
pensatory, or a reasonable rate to them, to the extent that all rates have been
steadily going up and being fixed at what you might say is a false rate, and it
is being done to protect all modes of transportation, but it is being done, we
are afraid, at the disadvantage of the shippers and the general public.
In appearing before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, the chairman of the ICC, Commissioner Freas, contended
that the Commission had consistently hewed to the policy of preserving
the full cost advantages of each form of transport and that apparent evi-
dences to the contrary were instances where the Commission was either
faced with a lack of cost data, or where it had restrained rate reductions
of a high-cost carrier that had lower out-of-pocket costs than its low-cost
competitor.7
At that point, the Commissioner was confronted with several de-
cisions by the Commission in which rates had been found to be fully
compensatory, but yet where the Commission had not granted the filed
rate reductions.' In explaining this aberration from the claimed policy,
Commissioner Freas conceded that the Commission has tried to main-
tain a higher scale of rates on certain "high class" traffic in order to
cover the general overhead and make possible the transport of other
commodities at less than full cost.9 This action was justified by the
7Id. at x66 ot seg.
"E.g., "The proposed rates which are lower than the rates maintained by tank-truck
common carriers by more than 2 cents are lower than necessary to meet the competition
and that their establishment would result in an unwarranted sacrifice of revenue and
constitute an unfair competitive practice." Id. at 175.
Also, "Considering these factors, the traffic would not bear its fair share of the
transportation burden under the proposed rates, and therefore, such rates have not been
shown to be just and reasonable." Id. at 176.
' "Commissioner FREAS. Now if we try to set the rates on all the competitive
traffic to just bear out-of-pocket costs, or a shade above, the carriers cannot continue in
business because the overhead burden, the revenue other than that which goes to pay
out-of-pocket costs, the revenue for those expenses has to come from somewhere.
"So when we come to that high class traffic, of which these are instances, the Com-
mission has tried to hold the scale on a somewhat higher level.
"Senator SMATHERS. You feel that by doing that, then other commodities are
permitted to be carried at lower costs, and it probably all averages out to the benefit of
the general public?
"Commissioner FREAS. That is right, the general overhead has to come from
somewhere." Ibid.
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Commissioner as being in the over-all public interest. He then went on
to pose the question as to the extent to which, if at all,10
... Congress desires to prohibit the maintenance of minimum rates on high
value commodities at a level higher than would be justified by cost considera-
tions alone.
implying, certainly, that the Commission in the past has held rates on
such commodities above cost. Unfortunately, the Senate Committee
did not answer the Commissioner's question directly.
From Commissioner Freas's testimony and the rest of the legisla-
tive record, it becomes reasonably clear that the difference between the
intent of the Eighty-fifth Congress and the interpretations of the ICC
reside in whether or not rates on high-value commodities should be
maintained above cost in order to subsidize the transport of low-value
commodities. There is little doubt that Congress has recorded itself in
opposition to the encouragement of intramodal competition, to unfair
and destructive competitive practices, and to intermodal competition at
rates below full cost, as will be seen. However, it is not entirely evident
that the Eighty-fifth Congress rejected value-of-service pricing as a gen-
eral proposition, although appearing to have condemned it where inter-
modal competition is involved. If that is the case, the present ubiquity
of such competition would seem to necessitate a concomitant application
of full-cost pricing. But, in 1940, Congress specifically refused to adopt
a full-cost rate-making policy.
The question, then, into which inquiry seems appropriate, is whether
in 194o Congress sanctioned the value-of-service brand of pricing (above
or below full cost) for which it now criticizes the Commission; and more
important, whether it seems likely that Congress has rejected that ap-
proach in the Transportation Act of 1958.
However, before entering upon an analysis of the intent of Congress
in I94O, it seems desirable to review briefly the rate-making policy which
preceded the Act of 1940.
I
EARLIER RATE-MAKING POLICY
In general, prior to 1920, the mission of the ICC was to restrain the
most extreme exploitations of the railroads' monopoly power. The
Commission was largely occupied with preventing individual carriers
from raising rates to outrageous levels. It had no responsibility for the
" Id. at 179.
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financial well-being of the railroads separately or as a whole; and, on
occasion, when the Commission outlawed rates which were excessive for
"strong" roads, it deprived competing "weak" roads of revenues pre-
sumably needed for their continued operation. Then, in areas served
by the "weak" road alone, public interest might be damaged."
In contemplation of the weak-and-strong-road problem, Congress
decided in 192o to abandon the attempt to force upon the carriers the
equivalent of a competitive pricing result and to treat the railroads as
a monopolistic aggregate. In the Transportation Act of i92o, it gave
the Commission a full array of powers over rates and directed the
Commission to set rail rates so as to make possible a fair return upon the
fair value of rail property. Congress, in effect, bestowed its blessing
upon monopoly pricing, subject to the restraints'imposed by the antidis-
crimination provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act and the public
utility ceiling on over-all return. The railroads were to be permitted,
and in some cases required, to refrain from competition with each other
and to establish a rate system essentially based on monopolistic exploita-
tion of demand.12
The transition from pre-i99o, characterized by uneven patterns of
competition-monopoly and sometimes acute discriminations, was achieved
slowly. Actually, uniformity of classification and of class rate scales over
the whole (almost) country did not come until 1952. Nevertheless, the
carriers had by the early 1920's, with the urging of the Commission,
set up three major classification territories, within each of which there
was substantial uniformity, and throughout the i92o's and early 1930's,
the ICC endeavored to establish uniform rate scales in rate territories.'
The adoption of monopoly pricing as a basic rate-making Piolicy
naturally did little to lessen the rail carriers' tendencies toward differen-
tial pricing. As might be supposed, much complaint continued to ema-
nate from industries and regions possessing, for one reason or another,
inelastic demands for transport. To placate these interests, which often
carried their complaints to high political levels, the ICC began, through
its powers to prevent "undue or prejudicial discrimination," 4 to average
out and isolate market demand relationships. This process was carried
on under public pressures which at times reached an extreme pitch, such
" LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTArION 2 39-41 (1954).
12 1 Stat. 456 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
"
8E.g., Eastern Class-Rate Investigation, 164 I.C.C. 3x4 (1930); Southern Class-
Rate Investigation, 10o I.C.C. 513 (1925), z28 I.C.C. 567 (1928).
"Interstate Commerce Act § 3, 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 41 Stat. 479
(1920), 49 U.S.C. § 2 (1952).
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as in the Lake Cargo15 and Southern Governors"6 cases. 17  Often, as in
port relationships where public pressures were powerful and insistent,
the Commission pragmatically worked out delicate adjustments that
mollified the interests involved, or at least balanced them, and retained
as much revenue for the carriers as possible."8 Also, in removing offen-
sive differentiation, the ICC sometimes required the raising of rates to
preserve revenues to the carriers. 9
Over time and under regional pressures, price differentiation tended
to become tied primarily to the identity of a commodity, as contrasted
with regional or local ties. It may be speculated that this tendency was
in part due to the geographical distribution of political power in the
United States. But probably more significant is the economic phenome-
non that demands for the transport of individual commodities tend to
be more discrete than demands for the transport of the same goods be-
tween different places. This is a matter of relative substitutability.
Lumber from the Pacific Northwest is more substitutable for lumber
from the Southeast than is butter for stovepipes. As a result, the
Commission began to permit wide differentiation in commodity classi-
fication and strove for uniformity in rate scales.20
Although economic discrimination in large degree may have per-
sisted within the uniform rate scales, so far as the public was concerned,
"discrimination" had been eliminated when it became possible to ship
"anywhere" on like rates. The Commission found, until the advent of
intermodal competition, that it was not impossible to raise rates, so
long as it was done uniformly and without affecting competitive rela-
tionships. The policy of rate-scale uniformity and commodity differen-
tiation seemed to be accepted by the public and became deeply engrained
as a "proper" procedure in rate-making, and even today, it is so cited by
transportation experts. 2 '
With the advent of the depression years, outcries against regional
differentiation grew louder, simultaneously with the decline of rail
revenues. This led the Commission to regard and cherish ever more
highly those noble commodities that would uncomplainingly bear a
1s 139 I.c.C. 367 (1928).
z67 I.C.C. 447 (.945)-
't See LOCKLIN, op. Cit. supra note xx, at 300, 319.
1 8SHARFMA, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 656 et seg. (936).
"'Id. at 530-32.
2 Id. at 541.
"See testimony of Commissioner Arpaia, Hearings, supra note 4, at 17; Ames, The
Transportation Act of z958, 26 ICC PRAc. J. 689-90 (x959).
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heavy load of overhead and to deplore carrier actions-competitively
inspired-that might endanger revenues.
The rising competition of other modes of transport, chiefly motor,
imposed additional strains on the monopolistic rate structure. Instead
of competing with the railroads on a broad front, the motor carriers
aimed at the traffic to which the rails had allocated the highest burden
of overhead cost. These forays shifted an even heavier burden to that
traffic having inelastic demand i and as might be expected, often the
inelasticity was shortlived, making ever smaller the captive traffic. The
railroads, nailed to the cross of regulation, after a rather half-hearted
effort at escaping, turned to a campaign to bring their free-enterprising
rivals under the regulatory umbrella.2  Their success is quite apparent.
Both regulation of motor carriers and water carriers was argued on the
floor of Congress as necessary to rescue the railroads from destitution
(as was the Transportation Act of 1958).
In 1933, Congress repealed the invocation to the ICC that it should
set rates so as to yield a fair return on the fair value of rail property.2
The new rule of rate-making was to consider the effect of rates on the
movement of traffic, the need of the carriers for revenue, and the need
of the shippers for economical transportation. It appears, however, that
Congress intended and the ICC understood that, in general, a monopoly
pricing policy was to be continued. In the Motor Carrier Act, to assure
motor carriers that their rates would not be "held up" to protect the
rail carriers, a provision was added to the rule of rate-making instruct-
ing the ICC to consider the "inherent advantages of motor transporta-
tion." 24  But dearly, the ICC was to attempt to moderate the compe-
tition among the then voracious motor carriers, 5 and, later, the Com-
mission offered no serious objection to the motor carriers' policy of
tying motor rates to rail rates. Manifestly, the ICC considered among
its regulatory obligations the prevention of the breakdown of the rail
rate structure. In the light of its responsibilities for the financial well-
" Revealingly, Senator Wheeler, in debate on the Transportation Act of 1940, re-
peated several times the claim that he alone had forestalled the repeal of the long-and-
short haul clause in the 193o's. Although repeal twice passed the House and would, he
said, have passed the Senate, Senator Wheeler strongly opposed it and suggested to the
rail carriers that instead they should support the regulation of their competitors. 84
CONG. REC. 588o and passim (1939).
23 48 Stat. 211 (1933) 40 U.S.C. 413 (x952). This provision had proved to be
unworkable both on legal and economic grounds.
49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §§ 3o, 302 (1952).
'ES. RE. No. 482, 7 th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1938).
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being of the carriers, it would appear that this was not an improper
interpretation of its duties.
II
DEBATE ON THE TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1940
In the debate on the Act of i94o, the rate-making problem was
thoroughly hashed out, resulting in an extended record of congres-
sional intent. The unusually lengthy discussion developed because of
a rate-making amendment attached to the bill on the floors of both
the House and Senate.26
Although the record is a mixed one, it seems reasonably apparent
that Congress did not intend that the ICC should venture greatly from
the monopoly rate-making policy that it had been construing since 1920.
Additionally, Congress made it dear in a statement of national policy
that the ICC's responsibilities for promoting filuancial health were to
extend to all the carriers subject to its supervision. As further emphasis
of this responsibility, Congress went on record as disapproving "unfair
or destructive competitive practices." On the other hand, Congress
made as a national policy the preservation of the inherent advantages
of each form of transport, and, in the rule of rate-making, it directed
the ICC to consider the effect of rates on the movement of traffic by the
mode to which the rates would apply.27
The congressional history of the Act of 194o indicates that Congress
wished to protect the traffic that each form of transport could handle
most economically. It did not want the railroads, on an out-of-pocket
cost basis, to take traffic from the water carriers, the motor carriers, or
vice versa. This attitude is gleaned from the following quotes:
Mr. NORRIS. Suppose, however, this bill should become a law, and an
article of freight were to be transported which admittedly could be carried by
"6 Senator Miller, of Arkansas, introduced the full-cost rate-making amendment in
the Senate, and Representative Wadsworth, of New York, in the House: "In order that
the public at large may enjoy the benefit and economy afforded by each type of trans-
portation the Commission shall permit each type of carrier or carriers to reduce rates
so long as such rates maintain a compensatory return to the carrier or carriers after
taking into consideration overhead and all the elements entering into the cost to the
carrier-or carriers for the service rendered."
The amendment was passed by the Senate unanimously, 84 CoNG. REc. 6074 (939)
and by the House, 147 to 119. Id. at 9977. In the 76th Congress, 3d Session, the bill
was returned to the conference committee by the House, with instructions to insist on the
Wadsworth amendment. 86 id. at 5886 (194o). Although the amendment passed the
Senate once and the House twice, the conference committee refused to report it in the
conference bill.
27s4 Stat. 788 (940), 40 U.S.C. § 36 (i9-5).
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water better than by railroad, and suppose the railroad should undertake to
reduce its rate down to the water rate: Would there be anything in the law to
prevent the railroad from doing that?
Mr. WHEELER. Of course there would be.
Mr. NORRIS. Disastrous rates can be brought about by reducing them just
as well as by increasing them, as a matter of fact.
Mr. WHEELER. Exactly.
Mr. NORRIS. And the water carrier ought to be protected on the freight
that ought to be carried by water rather than on the railroad.
Mr. WHEELER. It would be absolutely protected under this measure.
Mr. NORRIS. That is what I want to see done.
Mr. WHEELER. 'There is not any question about it. Under the rate-
making provision and under the other provisions I have read, there is not
any question about it. s
Mr. WHEELER.... I do say that if we want a coordinated national trans,
portation system, that the bill will stop some of the practices which have been
indulged in, such as temporarily cutting the rate on some commodities simply
to take some business away from the railroads. That is not helping the
general public in the long run.2
Mr. WHEELER. I suggested, the President of the United States sug-
gested, the Interstate Commerce Commission suggested, that the thing to do
was to place in an impartial body the right to regulate the rates of the water
carriers, not so that they would throw business over to the railroads but so
that they could not deliberately take out-of-pocket costs in order to break
down the rates of the railroad carriers and take over their business3 6
Mr. WHEELER. ... they [the railroads] are entitled to have their com-
petitors regulated not so as to enable them to raise their rates to give them
business, but so their competitors may not put into effect out-of-pocket rates--
rates upon which they lose money simply for the purpose of breaking down
the railroad rates..
Mr. WHEELER. One of the things we are seeking to do under the bill is
to prevent cutthroat competition.32
Mr. WHEELER. ... there is no man in this body who has fought harder
to protect the waterways of the country from competition than I have. When
the question as to the fourth section was pending the waterways interests
hardly had a friend in this body or in the committee. I went to work and
deliberately and personally held it up for 2 or 3 or 4 years in order to protect.
sa 84 CONG. REc. 5874 (1939).
29 Id. at 588o.
,"Id. at 5949.I% bid,.
32 86 CoNG. REC, 1I286 (1940).
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the waterways, because I knew if the fourth section were repealed that action
would destroy them, and I would not permit them to be destroyed.
Let me say that the Senator from Kansas has done everything in his power
to protect from competition the water carriers all the way through, and I
submit that today this bill does protect them.83
Mr. LEA. If this question relates purely to the cost of carrying a specific
item, then it does not bear an average return which is necessary to the carrier.
If you figure the carrier's full expense, including overhead, it is an entirely
different matter from simply providing the cost to the carrier for carrying
a specific item.
The gentleman who just spoke [Rep. Wadsworth] said that the burden
would be on the Commission in determining the question to find out what it
cost the carrier for a specific item. That is the old destructive method of
figuring costs that has been used to put a competitor out of business.
The only way out for the carrier on this basis is to have unduly high rates
in noncompetitive territory. If we permit a carrier to use this destructive rate
with large volume cheap commerce, then it means in noncompetitive terr-
tory you have an unduly high rate. That is one of the great troubles in this
country at the present time.
On the other hand, suppose this means the average cost of all expenses to
the carrier. The language says, [Wadsworth amendment] "so long as such
rates maintain a compensatory return to the carrier or carriers after taking
into consideration overhead and all other elements entering into the cost to the
carrier or carriers for the service rendered." For what service? For the
service of that specific article, and that tends to put it on the destructive out-
of-pocket cost basis.3 4
Mr. HALLECK. This bill seeks to take out of our system cutthroat com-
petition which is destructive of the interests of our people and of all the
carriers combined .... But when a representative of those interests tells me
that in this cutthroat competition they have cut their rates down to where
they are losing money, and the railroads followed, then I say somebody got
hurt.8 5
Mr. HALLECK. My question is prompted by my understanding that the
term "compensatory" is frequently interpreted to mean the out-of-pocket
costs, and of course if the rate reflected the out-of-pocket cost, then [the]
operation would not be at a loss, but the railroads have been continuously
attacked by their competitors because they have sought, on occasion, to carry
"Id. at xz6x6.
"' 84 CONG. REC. 9964 (1939). Mr. Lea was Chairman of the House Interstate
Commerce Committee.
"Id. at 9712. Mr. Halleck was a member of the House Interstate Commerce
Committee.
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freight at the out-of-pocket cost, and it is pointed out in Mr. Secretary Wal-
lace's letter that that is unfair competitive practice, and is destructive of the
competitors of the railroads; that they should not be permitted to carry freight
at that low rate e
Mr. WOLVERTON. The truth is that substantial water carriers, almost
without exception, are anxious and willing for regulation that will stabilize
an industry that is sorely depressed by the present cutthroat practices of the
chiselers within the industry3 7
Legitimate regulation must look to the protection of the economic advantage
of each type of carrier against destructive competition of the other 8 8
It seems, however, that if Congress' primary intent had been to
protect to each carrier the traffic in which it was most efficient on a full-
cost basis, the full-cost rate-making rule could have been adopted. But
Congress evidently believed that a rule of rate-making predicated on
the determination of full cost would have been extremely difficult to
administer, and, more important, would have resulted in the increase
of rates on a large number of basic industrial and agricultural com-
modities:
This proposed amendment [full cost rate-making], if enacted, would impose
numerous administrative difficulties; for instance, establishment of a permis-
sible rate on a given product would require the production of evidence to show
from the whole income and expense accounts of the carrier what rate would
be required to meet the standard of rate-making this amendment would
establish 8 9
Mr. LEA. In that event the objection to it [full cost rate-making], a very
serious one, is the administrative difficulty. If that is the meaning of this
language, the Commission is to take into consideration the full cost of car-
riage. Every little rate case involving a io-cent reduction in rates would
cast upon the Commission the burden of determining the full cost of carriage
on an average basis, including the high cost freight and the low cost traffic.
That is the reason why this amendment is objectionable from an adminis-
trative standpoint and from the standpoint of the carrier or shipper. '
Mr. WHEELER. As I have said, there are certain movements of freight
traffic on the railroads, or anywhere else for that matter, that will-not move
unless it has a cheap rate. Much of that includes agricultural products. The
eId. at 9962.
'Id. at iozo 6 . Mr. Wolverton was ranking minority member of the House Inter-
state Commerce Committee.
H.R. REP. No. 2832, 7 6th Cong., 3 d Sess. 88 (1940).
ssId. at 87.
, 84. CONG. REC. 9964 (1939).
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rates on these articles are not fixed on a full allocated cost which would
include overhead and profit and all the other things, but they figure what the
out-of-pocket cost is to move that freight and add something to it on the theory
that it is better to make a little profit than not to move the freight at all.
There are rates like that all over the country. There are rates made on a
basis other than the full allocated cost which have been made effective simply
to equalize the competitive advantages of different communities trying to get
into a consumer market. The Wadsworth amendment means that a rail
carrier could not reduce a rate below the full allocated cost in order to move
the traffic that otherwise would not be moved. It seems to me the effect of
this would be to raise the rates over the country, particularly on agricultural
commodities. I do not believe anyone wants that done. There is no sound
economic reason why it should be necessary for each rate to pay its share of
all costs and at the same time contribute something to profit. If rates were
made on this theory the classification of goods and commodities for rate-
making purposes would be next to impossible and as a consequence rates on
many commodities, particularly farm products, would be greatly increased.41
Mr. LEA. There is much freight at the present time that is carried as low
as 8o, under oo, [full cost] because of competitive conditions or because it
will not move at a higher freight rate. Cheap freight-low grade freight
like grain, fertilizer, sand and gravel, and building materials-must move at
that lower level on a narrow margin or they do not move at all. Therefore
the effect of the Wadsworth amendment would be to require this ioo-per
cent instead of 8o-per cent floor on which the freight rate structure is
founded.
The effect of this amendment, if put into practical effect and enforced, would
be to raise the freight rates on a large portion of the heavy commerce of the
United States. There is nothing unusual about that practice. In this coun-
try there is the greatest need of cheap transportation of any place in this
world because of the wide spread of the country and the great productive
centers we have scattered throughout the Nation.42
Mr. WOLVERTON. There are countless freight rates which are not on
the full cost basis-rates that were made so that traffic which could not
move on the higher rate levels could move at the prevailing rates. On such
a basis, America has developed industrially and agriculturally, and also on
this basis business is now established and adjusted.
Imagine, if you can, what would happen were this rate structure to be de-
stroyed. Much of the traffic now moving could move no longer. Many
industrial centers and agricultural regions which depend on low-cost trans-
portation to get their products to market would suffer immeasurably. Rates
41 S6 CONG. REc. 11290 (1940).
42 Id. at 10179.
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on other commodities would necessarily increase, thereby placing an added
burden on the shippers of these commodities and the eventual consumers.43
Senator Wheeler and other supporters of the bil thus found them-
selves in a position of condoning out-of-pocket cost rates when necessary
to move traffic, but of condemning them when used against or in re-
sponse to other carrier competition.
Mr. WHEELER. The shipping industry is in a bad way in any instance.
It has been stated that the shipping industry has been put out of business in
many places because someone would go into business temporarily and cut
rates and the established industry would have to come down in its rates. Such
practices destroy the economic order of the industry.
Mr. CLARK. What I was fearful about was that if permitted the thing
would happen again which has happened so often-that the railroads with
their vast capital, would cut their rates in order to put the water competitors
out of business. That is the game which the railroads have played for many
years.,
Mr. WHEELER. Let me say to the Senator that there was not a member
of the conference committee who did not want to take care of that very
thing. As I pointed out, we provided not only in the policymaking provision
of the bill but in the rate-making provision of the bill, that in considering
water rates the Commission should look at the water rates from the stand-
point of water carriers, recognizing the inherent advantages of water trans-
portation; and when it came to considering the rates charged by busses and
trucks, the Commission should do the same thing: and when the Commission
came to consider railroad rates, it should do the same thing.44
Mr. LEA. If you consider this as an out-of-pocket cost, then it is a destruc-
tive rate. It is the means by which railroads have driven boats off the rivers,
in times gone by. It is not legitimate competition if you permit one carrier to
carry it without profit in order to prevent the other fellow from making
something out of carrying it.45
Mr. LEA. Mr. Chairman, during the consideration of this bill the subcom-
mittee seriously considered whether or not we should not adopt an amendment
equivalent to this. We desired that some fixed. standard be established at
which the low-cost carrier would not be encroached upon by the higher-cost
carrier in fixing a rate.4"
Mr. WOLVERTON. The bill, as it stands, also fully protects one type of
common carrier from unfair rate-cutting competition by another having
"Id.at 1ox9!.
"Id. at 11624.
SB 84 CoNe. REc. 9964 (x939).
,bid.
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higher costs. In the light of its provisions, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission could not permit such unfair or destructive competitive practices.' 7
The inconsistency here was forced on the bill's sponsors by those
who feared that the ICC would "hold up" water rates to the level of
rail, or would permit the railroads to drive the water carriers out of
business. For example, Senator Miller, who introduced the full-cost
amendment in the Senate, commented as follows:4s
Mr. MILLER. I am fearful, however, that when the water carriers are
put under the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission it will not
result in leveling rates, but it will result in freezing rates at the highest points
now in existence, and that instead of permitting the water carriers to have
the effect upon rates that they now have in some instances, the rates will be
raised by the Interstate Commerce Commission. That is the fear I have.
Mr. WHEELER. Of course that is the fear that some persons have; but
if they take that position they have to say that they do not trust the Inter-
state Commerce Commission.
Mr. MILLER. To be perfectly frank, I do not. (Laughter)
Since this seemed to be the reaction of a substantial number of con-
gressmen, especially from the South and West, it was incumbent upon
the bill's sponsors to allay their apprehensions. Hence the strongly
stated intent "to preserve the inherent'advantages of each form": 40
Mr. WHEELER. (Quoting from- the legislative committee of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission) "In our judgment, the provision in question
[Miller amendment] is not necessary in order that the public at large may
enjoy the benefit and economy afforded by each type of transportation. The
requirement in the ratemaking rule that the Commission give due considera-
tion to the effect of rates on the movement of traffic by the carrier or car-
riers for which the rates are prescribed and also to the need in the public
interest, of adequate and efficient transportation by such carrier or carriers it
the lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service, coupled with the
admonition in the declaration of policy in section x that the provisions of the
act be so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages
of each mode of transportation, will afford adequate protection in this respect.
If experience should show that further protection is needed, contrary to our
expectations, Congress can then amend the Act, but such restriction as is
now proposed is, we believe, both unnecessary and undesirable."
" 86 CONG. REC. io191 (1940).
4884 CONG. REC. 588 (x939).
"86 CoNG. REc. 12go (940).
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If the bill's sponsors had gone no further, it might have been said
that congressional intent was to impose a full-cost standard on inter-
modal competition and to permit the established monopolistic pricing
policy to hold sway in circumstances where such competition was absent.
Aside from the administrative difficulties involved in such a policy,
which were recognized by Congress,50 gradually but eventually as com-
petition came to permeate transport markets, the full-cost standard
would apply to all rates. This was foreseen by Representative Wads-
worth in urging the passage of his amendment: 51
Mr. WADSWORTH. There may be some technical difficulty about arriving
at the compensatory rate, but, after all, Mr. Speaker, we have ceased now to
attempt to regulate monopolies. The railroads are no longer monopolies.
We have turned a complete somersault in this legislation, and we are now
attempting to regulate competition between types of carriers. You cannot
regulate competition between types of carriers unless your commission learns
through experience what the compensatory line is. They have to come to it
if they are going to regulate competition.
But Congress was not ready to embark on this approach to rate-
making except where insisted upon by the politically powerful com-
petitors of the railroads. It was evident that too many important in-
dustrial and agricultural commodities would encounter substantial rate
increases. It seems that persuasive testimony exists in the Congressional
Record that Congress intended that even in circumstances of inter-
modal competition where a high value commodity was involved (i.e.,
inelastic demand for transport), competition should be curbed in order
to retain needed revenues for the subsidy of low grade commodities
(elastic demand for transport).
Mr. WHEELER. This amendment [Wadsworth] had the most vigorous
objection of the legislative committee of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion headed by Commissioner Eastman. The Commission pointed out that
there are two kinds of costs, out-of-pocket costs and full allocated costs, which
are quite different. The amendment is not clear as to what- manner of cost
go 84 CONG. REc. 9966 (x939): "Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Chairman, I hesitate to
oppose the esteemed gentleman from New York with his amendment to this section of
the bill, but I should like to call your attention to a few things that I believe some of you
do not recognize.
"The making of rates by any commission on transportation is one of the most diffi-
cult and one of the most complex tasks that can possibly be conceived of. We in our
committee [Interstate Commerce] have tried to devise some better kind of formula for
ratemaking, but have utterly failed?'
" 86 CoNG. REc. 5867 (19+0).
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is meant, and it is also uncertain what is meant by a compensatory return. In
stating why the amendment was objectionable, the Commission said: "In the
past, the freight rates of railroads, and also of other carriers have taken into
consideration, not only costs of service but value of service or "what the
traffic would bear." This had the result of putting a somewhat dispropor-
tionate burden on the higher-valued commodities, particularly those capable
of a comparatively high car loading, but in general was approved by public
opinion. The intense transportation competition of the present day, including
the ability of many shippers to provide their own transportation, is tending
rapidly to break down this method of construing rates, and it may be that
eventually it will be impossible to give much, if any, weight to the so-called
value of the service.
Let us suppose, for example, a situation where competing railroads, coast-
wise steamship lines, and trucks are all maintaining, to their own and the
shippers' satisfaction in general, a comparatively high level of freight rates on
various packaged goods of high value, and some carrier, for the sake of a
temporary advantage, undertakes to cut these rates. If this must be allowed,
ultimately all the competing rates will be reduced and a hole created in carrier
revenues which may make it necessary to increase rates on traffic less able to
stand the burden. We think that it should not be allowed, and that the Com-
mission should be in a position to prevent such a train of events by exercise of
its authority over the minimum rates." 2
Mr. LEA. [Discussing the full-cost amendment] The amendment would
deprive the Commission of the discretion it ordinarily has in making rates.
Ordinarily the Commission considers the value of the freight, the value of
the service, the high or low cost of the freight, the conditions under which
it must be transported, the effect on the movement of traffic, and so forth."3
Mr. LEA. The high-cost freight, the high-priced freight, makes possible
the low-cost freight in the United States.5 '
Mr. WOLVERTON. Under the amendment [Wadsworth] Congress
would prescribe a rigid rule to control the Interstate Commerce Commison's
judgment concerning minimum rates. It has long been recognized that
making freight rates by statute cannot be successful. Neither can regulation
by arbitrary and inflexible ratemaking rules be successful. Flexibility and
elasticity are as important to transportation pricemaking as they are to price-
making in other industries, and rates cannot be made by formula, but must
be regulated by the sound judgment of an administrative body. 5
Everywhere in the world transportation rates take into consideration the
class of traffic carried and at what rate it will move. Raw materials such as
"Id. at i2go.
"Id. at 10178.
"Id. at 10179.
sId, at zoig.
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grains, farm products, coal, and other heavy materials frequently move at a
rate less than required by this provision [Wadsworth amendment]. Low-
profit freight compensates for its carriage, but ordinarily the carrier could not
successfully continue in business on low-cost freight alone. It is the greater
profit made on the high-class freight that makes the maintenance of our low-
cost transportation system possible.
5 6
Many low competitive rates have been secured by artificial reasons, not
based upon economic justification.
Many of these reductions are manifestly cutthroat rates. They are not
required by any economic duty to the shipper. They force the' retention of
individual high rates. They are not confined to cases where reductions are
necessary in order for the traffic to move, or to cases where the value of the
product moved requires their reduction.
57
This expression of intent, combined with the responsibility for the
economic health of the carriers5" delegated by Congress to the ICC,
would seem to provide all the grounds needed for the Commission to
embrace the views for which it now is being roundly criticized. Un-
doubtedly Commissioner Freas's question as to whether "Congress
wishes to prohibit the maintenance of minimum rates on high value
commodities at a level higher than would be justified by cost considera-
tions alone" was answered in 194o in the negative.
If a fundamental change in rate-making policy is to be made, it
seems fair to say that it must be initiated by Congress. It may be that
such a change has been brought about by the Transportation Act of 1958.
If the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee had not reiterated the
familiar strictures on "unfair or destructive competitive practices,' 5" the
" H.R. REP. No. 2832, 7 6th Cong., 3 d Sess. 87 (1940).1 H.R. REP. No. 1217, 7 6th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1939).
83 84 CONG. REc. 5874 (1939); "Mr. WHEELER. In the 192o Transportation
Act, what did the Congress of the United States do? The courts construed that act as a
mandate from Congress to the Commission to foster and to guard the railroads. The
Congress said to the Interstate Commerce Commission, 'It is your duty to protect the
railroads of the country.2 One or two members of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion have said to me that, as a matter of fact, the passage of the pending bill would
benefit the water carriers for exactly the same reasons... 2
83 Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Transportation Act of 1958,
S. REP. No. x647, 85 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958): "The committee wishes further to
emphasize that the amendment in regard to section 5 amending section x a of the act as
framed by the committee is designed to encourage competition in transportation by
allowing each form of transportation subject to the Interstate Commerce Act full oppor-
tunity to make rates reflecting the inherent advantages each has to offer, with such rate-
making being regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission, however, to prevent
'unfair or destructive competitive practices' as contemplated by the declaration of national
transportation policy. Under the committee amendment the principal emphasis, but not
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amendment might have been more convincing. Nowhere is there indi-
cation that the i94o significance of this term-namely, competition
rendered dissipations of revenue-has been abandoned. If that is the
case, and considering that intramodal value of service pricing is by no
means banned, it may be conjectured that the Commission would not be
unjustified in continuing to uphold rates on cigarettes, liquor, hardware,
etc. that qualify as high-value commodities. 60 For it is difficult to come
to any other conclusion than that destructive competition in transporta-
tion, as Congress has defined it, is simply normal competitive practice
in other industries."'
the exclusive emphasis, in a competitive ratemaking proceeding involving different modes
of transportation will be on the conditions surrounding the movement of the traffic by
the mode to which the rate applies."
'0 In 1939, Senator Wheeler spoke as follows: "It was the Congress of the United
States which in 1920 passed the Transportation Act and said to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission in effect, 'Fix rates so as to protect the riilroads. We should not
condemn the Interstate Commerce Commission. We should take the responsibility and
say, 'The responsibility rests upon the Congress of the United States and not upon the
Interstate Commerce Commission.' We do not like to do it, of course. If there is one
thing that the Senator or Representative likes to do, it is to find someone he can condemn
and say, 'I am not responsible for what has been done,' but we are to blame in this in.
stance because of the fact that we passed the law; and in my judgment, the Interstate
Commerce Commission has operated honestly and efficiently under it." 84 CoNG. REC.
5881-82 (939).
"This was perceived by one of the opponents of the Act of 1940: "Mr. SOUTH.
I do not want to appear harsh toward railroad management. They have had their diffi.
culties. So have the steel companies of this country and various other industries, in-
cluding the automobile manufacturers. What do you think a Ford, a Chevrolet, a
Plymouth, or a Buick automobile would cost if the government regulated the automobile
companies to prevent so-called cutthroat competition, about which we are hearing so
much in this debate? Cutthroat competition. What is cutthroat competition? Does
Henry Ford have cutthroat competition in the manufacture of his automobiles? Does
Walter Chrysler have cutthroat competition in the manufacture of his automobiles?
They certainly do; and yet because they have not been regulated, because we have not
stifled the initiative and the resourcefulness of the men who are in charge of this great
industryi but have permitted and encouraged keen competition, they have furnished us
cheap automobiles." Id. at 97z6.
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